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Chapter 1. Introduction 
Homeland Building: Nationalism, Identity, and Geographical 
Imagination in post-war Taiwan 
 
In 2004, two Kuomintang (KMT, Zhongguo guomindang)1 candidates running for the 
Presidency of Taiwan each made the public gesture of kneeling down to kiss the ground 
during their election campaigns. This symbolic act by the politicians was an 
unambiguous demonstration of their deep love for, and undying allegiance to, Taiwan. 
The last two decades of Taiwan’s history have been marked by a dramatic 
transformation in indigenous identity, expressed both in the rise of Taiwanese 
consciousness and a steady growth in Taiwan-centrism. Representing a party that has 
often stood accused of being “a foreign regime” (wailai zhengquan) (Shiba 1994), the 
KMT candidates’ attempt to win favor by declaring their love for and loyalty to Taiwan 
– by kissing the ground and kowtowing to the land – may simply have been a political 
necessity. However, behind the media hype and the opposition’s mockery, this political 
act can also be understood as a meaningful spatial practice; a strategy that signifies both 
membership and ownership of the land, producing spatial markers that identify its 
performers as insiders. 
 
In the last few decades, issues of Taiwan identity, the dramatic changes it has undergone, 
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the reasons for these changes, and the ways in which they have taken place, have been 
of great interest for many scholars working across various disciplines in both Taiwan 
Studies and China Studies. The narrative of nationhood promoted by the KMT regime 
during its 50-year rule of Taiwan had always been China-centric, regarding Taiwan 
merely as a small part of the great country. As time passed, this approach has become 
increasingly irrelevant and outdated, alienating the islanders from the land they inhabit.  
 
In the struggles for political and cultural hegemony that Taiwan has witnessed since the 
1980s, the focal point in contesting narratives and the key battlefield in the political 
debates are primarily spatial and place-based. The major fault line appears to be a split 
between an imposed identity emphasizing cultural origin (China) and an emphasis on 
the recovery of place identity of ‘the local’ (Taiwan). In the wake of the democratization 
process in the 1990s, a new discourse rapidly emerged that asserted Taiwanese 
subjectivity and advocated its independence and that brought about a dramatic identity 
change in the mid-1990s. In the struggle for political hegemony, great emphasis has 
been placed on Taiwan’s unique historical and cultural ‘positioning’ (B. Chang 2004; 
2006; 2009). In contrast to the previous China-centric focus, a more grounded discourse 
has been constructed to promote Taiwanese consciousness and create a longing for an 
‘authentic’ Taiwan (and Taiwanese roots). The indigenization issue has thus been at the 
center of Taiwanese politics. In 2000, the opposition party – the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP, minzhu jingbudang)2 – won the Presidential election and ended half a 
century of KMT rule. Since then, although the KMT regained power in 2008 and has 
adopted a more China-friendly policy, the indigenization trend has continued. In other 
words, the dramatic identity conflicts have resulted in a more local-focused identity. 
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Since no individual is outside or beyond geography, we are all bound up in the struggle 
over geography, which is, as Said (1993: 6) states, not only about “soldiers and cannons” 
that take possession of or defend a piece of land, but also “about ideas, about forms, 
about images and imaginings” that conceptualize our sense of place, enhance our 
understanding of the world, and equip us to navigate in our lives. However, these 
extremely influential spatial factors are often overlooked in the consideration of identity 
politics.  
 
My concern here is to see how our sense of place in the world can be influenced, shaped, 
or even constructed and (re)invented, through spatiality. To address the question of why 
the concept of ‘place’ which one can call one’s own is so important in the construction 
of identity, geographical imagination, and nation-building, the book adopts a spatial 
approach. In particular, my focus is on the importance of and the relationship between 
state spatiality and identity formation. Taking Taiwan as a case study, Place, Identity, 
and National Imagination in Post-war Taiwan aims to explore the relationship between 
the operation of state power and the construction of social space. Thus, the book looks 
at the long neglected spatial dimension of identity formation, examining the symbolism, 
construction, visualization, and contested meanings of Taiwan’s geography and 
political landscape. 
 
Colonial Context  
 
Located 100 miles off the southeast coast of China, Taiwan lies between Japan and the 
Philippines and had long been populated by Austronesian-speaking peoples before the 
arrival of the Chinese and Europeans. This tropical island came to the world’s attention 
 THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE 
AFTER PEER REVIEW 
 
at the turn of the 16th and 17th centuries when its European name – Formosa – first 
appeared.3 From the early 17th century, the Chinese, Japanese, Dutch, and Spanish had 
all sought control of the island, resulting in a colonial history that was both bloody and 
complex. Since that time, there was a succession of colonial occupations, first by the 
Europeans (1624-62),4 then by the Qing (1662-1895),5 and finally by the Japanese 
(1895-1945).6 One prominent result of the constant changes in political control is that 
there was never a single and stable identity for the islanders, or a clear-cut ethnic 
mixture. 
 
After World War II Taiwan and the nearby islands were retroceded to the Chinese 
government – the Republic of China (ROC, Zhonghua Minguo). Only four years later, 
the KMT-led ROC government was defeated in the Chinese Civil War and fled to 
Taiwan in 1949 under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. Approximately 1.5 million 
refugees and retreating army personnel fled from the mainland to Taiwan, accounting 
for roughly one-sixth of the island’s total population.7 Since the KMT retreat, the 
region under ROC direct control has an area of approximately 36,000 km2 in total, 
roughly equivalent in size to the Netherlands. The land that under ROC control is 
generally referred to as the ‘Taiwan region’ (Taiwan diqu)8 consists of the island of 
Taiwan and nearby islands, including the Penghu island group (i.e. the Pescadores), 
several frontier islands near China (such as Kinmen9 and Matsu), and a few small islets 
in the South China Sea.  
 
Both upholding a ‘one China’ policy, the two Chinese polities across the Taiwan Strait 
insisted on their own political legitimacy, leading to military confrontation at first and 
later to fierce struggles for international recognition and the right to represent the ‘real’ 
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China. During the Cold War, with American support and protection, the exiled KMT 
government in Taiwan managed to hold on to the Chinese seat on the United Nations 
(UN) Security Council as the legitimate Chinese representative for two decades until 
1971, rather than the People’s Republic of China (PRC), established by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. When the PRC was finally accepted as the Chinese 
representative at the UN in 1971, the international status of the ROC, and thus Taiwan, 
was formally cast into doubt. Immediately after the ROC’s withdrawal from the UN 
academics suggested some possible solutions to the problems raised by the issue of the 
ROC’s sovereignty (Chen and Reismant 1972), though its ambiguous status has never 
been resolved. Because of its problematic legal status, the ROC has often been barred 
or excluded from participation in international organizations as a sovereign member 
state, or at best, has been forced into a position in which it was treated as part of China 
(and implying merely a break-away province of the PRC).  
 
The impact of international isolation was not confined to the diplomatic arena. 
Domestically, the effects of isolation were equally detrimental. As a result of diplomatic 
defeats and international de-recognition, many difficult issues were brought to the fore 
and discussed fervently by the island’s population. If the world considered the PRC to 
be the legitimate Chinese government, what would be the ROC’s place in the world? 
Moreover, who then were the Taiwanese whose Chinese identity was rejected by 
international society? In the process of soul-searching and as a result of the self-doubt 
that arose from the island’s isolation, grievances over political, economic, and cultural 
inequality between the local Taiwanese (benshengren) and the newly arrived 
mainlanders (waishengren) began to surface. What was seen as the unfair distribution 
of power, resources, and capital became the key issue for Taiwan’s opposition 
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movement, and was deemed to reflect colonial suppression and cultural imperialism by 
the foreign (Chinese) regime.  
 
The Local and the Newcomers  
 
For immigrant communities such as Taiwan, the bonds with the land that they have long 
inhabited and the constructed ‘homing desire’ 10  to return to the ancestral home 
sometimes seem contradictory. The crucial factor influencing people’s identity in 
Taiwan has been shengji – that is, the province of one’s birthplace or origin and also 
known as benji (original home) or zuji (ancestral home). During most of the post-war 
period, people in Taiwan generally categorized themselves as either ‘benshengren’ or 
‘waishengren’: the former term meaning ‘people from the local province’ and usually 
referring to the Taiwanese, the latter term meaning ‘people from other provinces’ and 
commonly referring to the mainlanders who came to Taiwan after the end of World War 
II. The category of benshengren is seen to consist of three groups of people: aboriginal 
people (yuanzhumin),11 Minnan,12 and Hakka,13 and generally signifies people who 
lived in Taiwan and whose ancestors migrated to the island before the Chinese take-
over. The category of waishengren mainly refers to those who came to Taiwan after 
1945, no matter from which part of China. Thus, the division is carved arbitrarily and 
homogenously, ignoring the many differences. The term ‘waishengren’ carried negative 
connotations for the local Taiwanese, in part because of the rampant corruption 
experienced under Chinese rule following the departure of the Japanese and the arrival 
of ill-disciplined Chinese soldiers and officials working under Governor Chen I. The 
tension between benshengren and waishengren occurred soon after the Chinese take-
over and eventually erupted in the February 28 Incident of 1947.14 This incident, in 
 THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE 
AFTER PEER REVIEW 
 
which the armed police killed unarmed protestors and which led to a bloody suppression 
island-wide, was an old wound that remained unhealed and became a taboo subject for 
many decades. The deep-rooted mistrust and resentment between the two groups could 
not be easily overcome or forgotten. 
 
Except for Taiwan’s aboriginal people, who account for 2.29 per cent of the island’s 
total population,15 most people in Taiwan are ethnic Han Chinese.16 Apart from the 
aboriginal people, the division of Taiwanese identity rests not simply on ancestral 
origins, but also depends on the point in time when one’s ancestors migrated from the 
mainland. In other words, Taiwan’s identity conflicts are not exacerbated by issues of 
ethnicity; rather, they are further complicated by a politically generated agenda. The 
simplistic and somewhat arbitrary categorization proposes a fixed definition of each 
group’s identity regardless of variables such as intermarriage, actual place of birth, and 
personal circumstances, affiliation and choice. Not everyone fits neatly into one of these 
categories.  
 
Even so the dichotomy between the two identities – the benshengren (the local) and the 
waishengren (the newcomers) – had always been obvious, and the gap started to widen 
in the first half of the 1990s. Although the KMT’s China-centric governance, 
compounded by its authoritarian rule and ideological construction, was extremely 
effective in the early post-war decades, the ways in which the Taiwanese people 
identified themselves changed dramatically in the mid-1990s. For example, before the 
DPP took power in 2000, 62 large-scale surveys were carried out between 1989 and 
2000 on the issue of ‘how the Taiwanese identified themselves.’ 17  Although the 
surveys were conducted by various institutions and their results did not always 
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correspond entirely, the overall trend was congruent and consistent. Before 1994, the 
majority of the islanders identified themselves as ‘Chinese only’ or as ‘both Chinese 
and Taiwanese,’ while less than one-fifth of the interviewees identified themselves as 
‘Taiwanese only.’ 18  After the rising hostility across the Strait and the growing 
negativity associated with China in the mid-1990s, the result of the surveys on self-
identification was reversed, the turning point being reached in 1994. While the majority 
of respondents classed themselves as ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese,’ the number of 
those who identified themselves as ‘Chinese only’ steadily decreased, and those 
identifying themselves as ‘Taiwanese only’ continued to grow.19  
 
The reversal of Taiwanese identity happened within only a few years in the mid-1990s. 
Both the process of making Taiwan ‘home’ and the demarcation of borders between 
inside and outside both contribute to the creation of an effective place-identity. After 
all, the politics of assuming an ‘insider ’ identity are also “the politics of 
claiming power” (Rose 1995: 116). A strong sense of inside-ness can easily be 
employed to arouse nationalist fervor and also to stir up hostility towards ‘the Other’ – 
both of which are strategies regularly used in the construction and 
articulation of state spatiality.  Thus, identity politics have driven Taiwan’s push 
for democratization and social justice during the last two decades. But they have also 
created social divisions, conflicts and political upheaval. Consequently, identity tension 
came to a head at the beginning of the 21st century.  
 
The Fish in the Water 
 
As Taiwan’s identity crisis deepened, the main issue appeared to be a rift between how 
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people identified themselves politically and spatially. In other words, the major fault 
line appears to be a gap between the imposed Chinese identity emphasizing cultural 
origin and political daotong (i.e. Confucian orthodoxy) and the emerging Taiwanese 
consciousness demanding a recovery of ‘the local’ and an emphasis on the locality. 
Unlike the existing literature, this book adopts a spatial approach and explores the issue 
of Taiwanese identity by examining spatial politics. The importance of space is not 
simply a question of where things happen and where people are placed. The 
significance of space has to do with the fact that it is where people perform their daily 
spatial practices, where social hierarchy is established, actualized and reinforced, and 
where power is exercised and cemented. In any case, we are located and live in a 
geographical environment, and we develop a relationship with our surroundings, 
shaping them and being shaped by them. However, people rarely notice the hidden 
effect and the structural impact of their surroundings. Tuan (1990: 63) describes this 
unconsciousness as a person’s “immersion in the totality of his environment,” while 
Cresswell (2004: 109) uses an old Sri Lankan saying to explain this blindness: “The 
fish don’t talk about the water.” Although space seems to be in the background, as a 
context and social framework, it is always present in the conception and the operation 
of power. This spatial structure should not just be seen as a domain where social life 
takes place, but rather “as a medium through which social relations are produced and 
reproduced” (Gregory and Urry 1985: 3). Space is omnipresent, and so is its framing 
of our life and views. Just like the influence of culture, the most powerful elements of 
space are its transparency and its seemingly realistic naturalness (Lefebvre 1976: 27-
30).  
 
It is indeed not easy to ‘see’ one’s taken-for-granted environment, feel the structural 
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limitation or sense the subtle influences in which one is submerged, even though this 
environment has a huge and incessant impact on our sense of self. Thus, our sense of 
identity is closely connected to where we are positioned, both socially and 
geographically, and is intertwined with our sense of place, which in turn informs our 
view of our ‘place in the world.’ This sense of place is constantly changing and being 
reshaped, depending on our lived experience, position (physical and social), and the 
cultural framework within which we are placed. Simply speaking, sense of place can 
be positive (i.e. identifying with a place), negative (i.e. identifying against a place), or 
indifferent (i.e. not identifying with a place) (Rose 1995). Moreover, senses of place 
have different scales. Every individual is immersed in space and surrounded by 
“concentric ‘layers’ of lived space,” from one’s bedroom to home, neighboring areas, 
city, region and nation (Buttimer 1976: 284). In other words, senses of place vary from 
person to person but can also differ from time to time for any one individual. This 
feeling of ‘in place’ or ‘out of place’ not only suggests some kind of connection between 
a person and a particular location, but it is also closely associated with a sense of 
belonging, ownership, and even a fixed position in the social hierarchy (e.g. ‘knowing 
one’s place’). The combination of the concentric circles of space and their 
corresponding sense of place lays the foundation of our identity and shapes a “lifeworld” 
that acts as the anchor and the navigation structure in life.20 In other words, the place 
in which we are located is not external to us acting as a kind of mise-en-scène for things 
to happen or dramas to unfold. Rather, it symbolizes, materializes, and also 
contextualizes the place we occupy in the world. It is both outside of us (environment) 
and inside of our being (socially, culturally and politically). 
 
Without a doubt, our sense of identity is closely connected to our sense of place, 
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particularly the concentric understanding of the extension of oneself – i.e. ‘home,’ 
‘homeland’ and ‘country.’ Among all the different kinds of places, ‘home’ is considered 
by many geographers to be the ‘ideal place’ and “an exemplary kind of place where 
people feel a sense of attachment and rootedness” (Cresswell 2004: 24). For example, 
Anne Buttimer (1976: 284) describes home as the “zero point” of one’s “personal 
reference system,” while Yi-fu Tuan (1977: 128, 149) sees home as occupying the 
central part of one’s life that seemingly “connotes origin and beginning” and serves as 
“the focal point of one’s cosmic structure.” Gaston Bachelard (1994: 4, 7) discussed the 
role of one’s childhood home in a similar way, designating it in metaphorical terms as 
“our corner of the world… our first universe,” “the human being’s first world” and 
“cradle.” Thus, home occupies an important place in one’s life and is seen as the 
manifestation of one’s identity. 
 
On a personal level, home is often described as “an irreplaceable centre of significance” 
that defines who a person is and manifests his or her identity (Relph 1976: 39). Similarly, 
homeland has been, and continues to be, seen as the ‘nurse’ and ‘mother’ for the people 
who inhabit it, while also containing an archive of memories, history and past 
achievements. In other words, ‘home,’ on whatever scale it may be conceptualized, is 
the ‘perfect place’ that exemplifies ‘a field of care’ and ‘a repository of memories and 
dreams’ of human beings (Tuan 1977: 164). Within the concentric layers of one’s 
lifeworld, the intimate affection for home can also be projected upon other kinds of 
belonging. On a higher level, the profound attachment to the homeland (and country) 
is regarded as a universal phenomenon in modern society. The transfer of an intimate 
personal feeling to a collective commitment and loyalty to one’s ‘homeland’ is welded 
on to a locality by culture, because we usually think of our culture as our ‘home’ (Hall 
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1995: 182). 
 
Yet, I do not suggest that everyone’s idea of home is the same, or that it always 
necessarily represents a sense of warmth, love and protection. Nor do I intend to portray 
‘home’ only as an ideal place and a safe haven that everyone longs for and cherishes. 
Feminist geographers, such as Rose (1993) and McDowell (1998), have already shown 
that the positive and central position of the concept of ‘home’ is debatable, and have 
also argued successfully that ‘home’ can also be where the oppression of women takes 
place. Equally, ‘country’ can be the site of discrimination, exploitation, and suppression. 
However, I use the term here in a broad sense to address the issue of identity formulation, 
and to refer to a general idea of ‘belonging.’ After all, home acts as a mental coordinate 
system that positions us in the world and informs our sense of place, as with Bachelard’s 
depiction of the influence of the childhood home in which “our memories of former 
dwelling-places are relived as daydreams that … remain in us for all time” (1994: 6). 
In other words, home leaves its marks on us, positive or not, and defines the way we 
are and how we identify ourselves. Thus, our identity is not just shaped by culture and 
ethnicity, but also by the space we occupy – both geographically and socially – and the 
unique experience inscribed in it. 
 
We are all ‘spatial beings,’ living in and participating in physical, social, and mental 
spaces. We make places and places also make us. Those who inhabit a particular place 
will usually use the same language, eat the local food, share the culture, values, and 
customs of a place, and understand the place intimately. As Edward Relph aptly states, 
“people are their place and a place is its people” (1976: 34). There is indeed no better 
way to understand a place than by being in that place. For the most part we embody (or 
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at least are expected to embody) the place we are part of. Hence, places are the defining 
marker of one’s experience and identity and influence the making of one’s sense of 
place. The significance of one’s ‘place in the world’ is closely connected to one’s 
locality and social standing and thus, one’s ‘place’ becomes one’s identity, 
geographically, politically, culturally, and socially. It is worth noticing though that 
different articulations of identity for any one place often coexist and compete at the 
same time. Parallel to the continuous change, contradiction, and contestation of identity, 
the meanings of places are never fixed or completed, but always negotiating, shifting 
and ‘becoming’ – in common with identity, which is always multifaceted, constantly 
changing and forever slippery and contradictory.  
 
Longing for Rootedness 
 
The desire to have a place where one feels comfortable and at home is natural, and is 
“perhaps the most important and least recognized need of the human soul” (Weil 1987: 
41). The development of sense of place is therefore intimately connected to the place 
in which one is located and which one calls ‘home.’ For most people, the place and the 
culture to which they belong manifest their identity, while their ancestral home is 
usually regarded as their ‘roots.’ Any incongruity between the place one identifies as 
home and the place in which one is actually located may create anxiety and alienation, 
and also arouse suspicion and hostility from those who identify themselves as insiders. 
This close connection between place and identity is extremely prominent in Chinese 
tradition. Fundamentally, the Chinese are place-bound, and as Lynn Pan (1991: 12-3, 
21) said, few can “beat” the Chinese commitment to their native land and ancestral 
origin. The very name of the country – Zhongguo (literally ‘the country in the center’) 
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– reveals the central position the Chinese have assigned themselves and the importance 
they attribute to their own ‘place’ in the world.  
 
In traditional Chinese society, attachment and loyalty to one’s native village or 
hometown was always strong. People preferred to be rooted, staying put in their place 
of origin. Historically, those who moved away from their native land to a new place 
would be considered ‘visitors,’ ‘guests’ and ‘outsiders,’ both by the locals and by 
themselves, even after several generations. The best example of this is the ethnic group 
Hakka – whose name clearly labels them as “guest people” who are “not local.” The 
attachment to one’s native land, and the unwillingness to move are both deeply 
ingrained in the Chinese psyche and are described by the proverb ‘an tu zhong qian’ – 
which means ‘to be content on one’s native soil and consider moving a serious affair.’ 
For people who had left their ancestral home, the desire to ‘return home’ at the end of 
their life’s journey was always powerful, even after decades, and sometimes generations, 
of ‘sojourning.’21  
 
This yearning to return to one’s ancestral home has been described as a longing of 
‘luoye gui gen,’ literally translated as “the falling leaves return to the roots.” The 
nostalgic sense of the loss of laojia (old home), guxiang (homeland or hometown), 
jiaxiang (homeland), or yuanxiang (original hometown), has deeply affected Chinese 
consciousness.22 The Han immigration communities in Taiwan had also inherited this 
mentality and had always referred to China as ‘Tangshan,’ the generic reference to their 
ancestral origin on the mainland. Similarly, such a desire of and longing for ‘returning’ 
has been common in Taiwanese society. For example, in his renowned novel Hanye 
Trilogy (hanye sanbuqu), Taiwanese writer Li Chiao compared people’s longing for 
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home with the natural instinct of salmon (1981: 420). He believed that the pull of home 
was a natural calling for the Taiwanese, just like the genetic urge of salmon to return to 
their place of origin, despite the difficulties of covering long distances in the ocean and 
swimming hundreds of miles upstream. Thus, the desire to ‘return home’ is usually seen 
as inherent and natural, and is considered to be the ultimate goal in life for those who 
had left home.  
 
Traditionally Chinese liked to signal their ‘place identity’ in order to indicate their 
belonging. For example, it was common practice among Chinese intellectuals to 
supplement their names with information about their birthplace, or to add geographical 
factors when formulating their courtesy names 23  or naming their children, their 
workplace, their studies, or the house in which they were living, so as to identify 
themselves spatially. However, spatialized names are used as an identity indicator not 
just by locals wishing to identify their origin. It was equally important to mark out one’s 
identity as an outsider, a guest traveler, or someone in transit. For example, many babies 
were named Yu-sheng (literally meaning ‘being born in Yu’) during the anti-Japanese 
war period when the ROC government set up its provisional capital in Chongqing (aka. 
Chungking), which was also known as Yu. Similarly, many post-war baby boomers in 
Taiwan were given place-based names.For example, in the late 1940s and 1950s many 
boys were named Tai-sheng – meaning ‘being born in Taiwan,’24 while girls might be 
named Tai-li – meaning ‘beauty in Taiwan.’ Such naming practices not only specified 
the babies’ birthplace, but was also seen as a record of their parents’ displacement and 
as a marker of their ‘outsider’ status. Any place in which one resided outside of one’s 
hometown, however wonderful and prosperous, was traditionally viewed only as a 
“temporary dwelling” (jiju or jiji)25 that could never equal the importance of laojia, 
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even if the home that one had left behind might be war-ridden or poverty-stricken. In 
comparison to the supreme status of homeland (e.g. jiaxiang, guxiang, laojia, or benji), 
in which psychological belonging is anchored and loyalty invested, other places are 
regarded only as a foreign land (yixiang), from which one might feel alienated and lack 
a sense of belonging.  
 
Loyalty to the ancestral home is especially evident in overseas Chinese communities. 
In order to support their fellow villagers, and others emigrating from the same region, 
overseas Chinese usually formed a tongxianghui (Fellow Townsmen Association) as a 
bonding mechanism, providing a self-help network to support socialization, 
communication, and the transaction of business (Sinn 1997). The fervent longing for 
‘home’ of the overseas Chinese – who might never have seen or visited their ‘homeland’ 
– speaks volumes about the strong connection between the Chinese identity and their 
sense of home. Similarly, traditional Taiwanese identity had also been closely linked 
with the ideas of “home,” “native soil,” and the place of one’s original home. The fierce 
armed conflicts between groups of settlers from Zhangzhou and Quanzhou under Qing 
rule manifested the importance of different regional belongings and loyalties, even 
though they all came from Minnan. 
 
This focus on origin thus harbors the danger of creating (or assuming) a timeless and 
universal identity and proposing an essentialist view in which one’s origin is fixed and 
permanent. Furthermore, such emphasis on an essential and mythified ‘origin’ is 
anachronistic in a fast changing, highly mobile and increasingly globalized world. 
Indeed, this notion of origin, which is often imagined and constructed, hinders any 
attempt to make new homes for those displaced by migration. The imagined close ties 
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with one’s guxiang (or jiaxiang) not only make leaving home particularly traumatic, 
but also make it difficult for the outsiders to be integrated into an established community. 
 
Space, Identity, and Spatiality 
 
After the ‘cultural turn’ that brought sweeping changes to the social sciences and 
humanities in the 1980s, a recent ‘spatial turn’ has injected these disciplines with a new 
theoretical energy and has also enriched, and even revolutionized, intellectual thinking 
across disciplinary boundaries (Warf and Arias 2009). Scholars working in these areas 
have become increasingly interested in the concept of deep space and its socially 
constructed nature.26 The fundamental issue considered in this book is exactly how the 
‘self’ is spatially expressed and socially constructed. In understanding questions such 
as how societies operate, the ways in which politics function, and the ways and extent 
to which cultures and identities are constructed, the spatial approach provides a new set 
of insights that explores “what gnaws at it [the society] from within” (Lefebrve 1991: 
420). 
 
In my examination of the spatial development of post-war Taiwan, I draw particular 
inspiration from the work of Henri Lefebvre. In his book The Production of Space 
(1991), Lefebvre challenges the conventional concept of ‘space,’ which is commonly 
treated as an inert spatial medium, merely a ‘container’ for more important historical 
processes. He argues that space is not a passive background to historical events, but 
rather a socially constructed mechanism inducing events to develop in a certain way. 
The process of spatial production is reproduced, expounded, and supported by 
knowledge of this space. Thus, every society produces its own space, and within each 
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social space social actions take place which are shaped by its subjects (both as 
individuals and as a collective). In other words, social change and new social 
relationships necessitate the production of a new space, and vice versa. Since every 
society produces its own space and unique social relations at different historical 
junctures, any new social relationship calls for the emergence of a new space, which 
incorporates social actions, in order to materialize the spatial order into physical reality 
(Lefebvre 1991: 31-6, 53-9). Since space is produced, the examination of changes in 
the production of spaces and their meanings can be used to map out the changing course 
and to read the implications of social and power relations at any particular moment. 
This not only reveals how new spaces come about and why some places have 
disappeared, but it also demonstrates how and why our perceptions of a place have been 
drastically changed at a particular historical moment.  
 
For Lefebvre, space is at the center of a continuing social and historical process, 
involving struggles over ideology, meanings and values, and is thus the ultimate locus 
and medium of politics (Elden 2007). He suggests that the understanding of space 
should break away from the previous dichotomy of ‘spatial practices’ (i.e. relating to 
material and physical space) and ‘representations of space’ (i.e. relating to mental and 
abstract space), and proposes to include a third element in the production of space. This 
additional dimension – ‘spaces of representation’27 – refers to social spaces that are 
lived, experienced, expressed, recoded, and created through the actions of those who 
occupy and use them. In Lefebvre’s ‘spatial triad’ – i.e. perceived space, conceived 
space, and lived space – each element corresponds to another, and operates at all times. 
This approach towards space provides a deeper understanding of both the real and 
imagined world.  
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Both as the product and (re)producer of power relations, space can not only regulate 
and maintain relations of domination, but also challenge and even change existing 
power relations. According to Lefebvre (2009: 244-5), state space “‘regulates’ and 
perpetuates the relations of domination,” and consists of three important dimensions – 
the ideological (the technocratic representation of the social), the practical 
(instrumental, a means of action), and the tactical (strategic – consisting principally in 
the subordination of a territory’s resources to political ends). Because the exercise of 
power is deeply inscribed in space, ‘state space’ plays a crucial (albeit almost invisible) 
role in state control and domination, and is seen as the spatial articulation of state power. 
In other words, states aggressively engage in the production of space for the purposes 
of governance and manipulation and, in turn, are shaped and reshaped by the space 
produced. Thus, the three dimensions of Lefebvre’s theorization of ‘state space’ – the 
state territory, the state territorial strategies, and the “territory effect” (which is the 
state’s tendency to naturalize certain socio-spatial relations) (Brenner and Elden 2009) 
– are particularly insightful in the examination of the spatial dimensions of state power 
where they are most directly articulated.  
 
The spatial structures of our environment lay the foundations for sense of place to 
develop, influence the formation of identity, and provide both a physical and mental 
structure for us to position ourselves in the world. Thus, power is operated through 
‘spatiality’ which concretizes a spatial discourse to provide a ‘spatial order’ that 
organizes an ensemble of possibilities and interdictions (de Certeau 1984: 98). 
Although the concept of ‘spatiality’ in human geography is widely used, it is 
nevertheless difficult to formulate an all-encompassing definition (Gregory at el. 2009: 
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715-17). ‘Spatiality’ can be many things: actual material space and jurisdiction, socially 
produced space, virtual space, spatial metaphor, assumptions about the nature of space, 
the quality of a space, everyday spatial practices and experience, and so on (Hillis 2006: 
455). Generally speaking, it refers to the quality of material space, the influence of 
spatial metaphors, and most often to both. Many scholars now use the term specifically 
to refer to ‘socially produced space,’ understood to extend far beyond physical settings 
or measurable surface appearances. Furthermore, since a dominant spatial discourse 
brings about a spatial order that organizes and regulates people’s lifeworld, state 
spatiality can be understood as the articulation of power relationships, that is, the spatial 
structure where powers operate (or are challenged), politics function, and a state-
engineered identity is formulated. Thus, it is essential to adopt a spatial perspective 
when examining the relationship between identity, power, and place.  
 
Theoretical Neglect  
 
Identifying the emphasis placed on historicism as a 19th century obsession, Foucault 
acknowledged the importance and the long-standing neglect of space. He asserted that 
the 20th century was “the epoch of space…the epoch of simultaneity… of 
juxtaposition… of the near and far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed” (1986: 22). 
His criticism of the over-emphasis placed on history certainly rings true in Taiwan 
Studies. Although there is a rich corpus of literature on the political, economic, social 
and cultural aspects of Taiwanese identity and nationalism from a historical 
perspective, 28  the spatial dimension has seldom been touched upon. Since the 
positioning of the ‘self’ and the identification of home and homeland are fundamental 
in the formation of identity, the spatial aspect of both identity politics and cultural 
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nationalism is crucial, but unfortunately is rarely addressed. In the English-speaking 
world, relatively little attention has been paid to the spatial aspect of Taiwan, and the 
modest number of publications from this perspective contrasts sharply with the active 
and flourishing research on Taiwan’s history, politics, and economy. Among those who 
have published in this field in the early post-war decades, the better known are perhaps 
Cheng-siang Chen (1950; 1963; 1982), Chiao-min Hsieh (1964), Ronald Knapp (1976; 
1980), and Jack Williams (1973).29 However, most of this early literature tended to 
work with a more narrowly defined concept of ‘Geography’ – i.e. “the study of the 
systems and processes involved in the world’s weather, mountains, seas, lakes, etc. and 
of the ways in which countries and people organize life within an area” (Cambridge 
Advanced Learner's Dictionary) – and dealt mainly with the physical, political, and 
economic aspects of Taiwan’s geography.  
 
In recent decades, related publications have grown in number, and their scope has also 
expanded to include historical geography, urban studies, political landscape and 
environmental issues (e.g. Edmonds 1992; 2001; Wachman 2007; Teng 2004; Matten 
2012; Williams and Chang 2008, etc.). In addition, scholars in other disciplines have 
also started to draw inspiration from the ‘spatial turn.’ For example, some have taken 
an anthropological approach to place and religion (e.g. Dell’Orto 2013), some criticized 
the stagnation of Taiwan’s ‘feminist geography’ (Chiang and Liu 2011), others have 
examined spatial elements in Taiwan literature (e.g. A. Yee 2001), and still others have 
focused on ‘nature writing’ in the wake of Taiwan’s growing environmental awareness 
(e.g. M. Fan 2007). Historians have explored the construction of geographical 
imagination as it related to Taiwan during the Qing dynasty (e.g. Teng 2004), examined 
Taiwan’s cartographic representation in historical maps (e.g. Lay et al. 2010; L. Hsia 
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2008), and considered colonial governance ( e.g. H. C. Tsai 2009). The development of 
Taipei city, and its spatial innovation and recent globalization are the focus of many 
academic enquiries (e.g. Allen 2011; Kwok 2005; Leitner and Kang 1999; C. Wang 
2003; Simon 2003). The contemporary issues of alternative identities, sense of 
neighbourhood, and new social behaviors are also included in the discussion of 
Taiwan’s landscape (F. Martin 2000; Lin et al. 2006; Wilson 2009; Hsieh and Chang 
2006.), while the preservation of Taiwan’s historical heritage and the politics of 
landscape are seen as the new phenomena in post-democratization society (Taylor 2005; 
Simon 2003; C. Hsia 2002). However, research on state spatiality in general and the 
effect of spatial politics on Taiwanese identity in particular, remains an area in which 
there is still much to be done. Moreover, most research on Taiwan has tended to focus 
on the Japanese or Dutch colonial periods or on the Chinese influence during the Qing 
dynasty, while the post-war era has been relatively neglected.  
 
Inspired by the newly emerging ‘spatial-cultural discourse’ in cultural studies (Deutsche 
1995), this book aims to explore Taiwan’s identity politics and post-war power relations 
through the examination of spatiality. Since culture is always placed, both the 
production of culture and the construction of meaning have strong spatial influences. 
Thus, any analysis of the production of culture and the formation of identity that does 
not consider the politics of ‘positions’ fails to take stock of its spatial context. Therefore, 
this book sets out to bridge the academic gap between identity and spatial politics, by 
examining the relationship between place and power. By looking through the lens of 
spatiality, I hope to provide a fresh perspective on the thorny issue of Taiwanese identity. 
 
Drawing on Lefebvre’s work, Treasure Island thus addresses issues of how state spatial 
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practices continuously shape and reshape our everyday life, the ways that geographical 
knowledge and imagination are constructed, and also how state territorial strategies 
naturalize and strengthen power relations through spatial discourses. Furthermore, I 
examine the ways in which state spaces are operated, contested and changed and, lastly, 
how through state spatiality, power relations are concretized, social alliances 
established, and cultural change takes place. In my examination of identity politics, I 
also draw on theoretical support from Edward Said (1989; 1993; 1995) and Stuart Hall 
(1990; 1995), especially in the Postscript, to consider the recent de-colonization and 
nation-building processes in Taiwan.  
 
Though the case of Taiwan is regionally specific, the major concerns of this book are 
universal. They relate to territoriality and national identity; the relationship between 
geography, power, and identity; the spatial aspect of cultural nationalism; and state 
spatiality in the nation-building process. My ‘transgression’ of disciplinary boundaries 
is an exploratory intervention into the complex interplay between place, identity, 
politics and nationalism in post-war Taiwan and hopefully will provide a fresh approach 
to understanding the issue of Taiwanese identity and stimulate a rethinking of how state 
spatiality influences national identity. 
 
Arrangement of Chapters 
 
Since the meaning of and the discourse about a place may at times conflict and at other 
times be mutually reinforcing, every society produces a particular kind of space, and 
socially constructed space is period- and region-specific. To understand Taiwan’s 
geography, my own study must therefore be conscious of being historically situated. 
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My focus is on the state spatiality of the post-war period. This period demands 
particular attention not just because the era has often been overlooked in the existing 
literature, but more importantly because it was only in the second half of the 20th 
century that “the massive interrogations of space, the city, hyper growth and excess, 
and the organization of space” took shape (Lefebvre 2009: 212). Using Lefebvre’s 
spatial triad as its underlying analytical framework, this book explores post-war 
construction of ‘state space’ in Taiwan – in Lefebvre’s words, i.e. the state territory, its 
territorial strategies, and the territory effect – be it physical, symbolic or functional. 
Four chapters that follow this introduction will explore various aspects of state 
spatiality and its impact on identity, specifically by looking at national territory and 
state territorialization, the power and politics of cartography, the construction of 
national geography and knowledge, and a modernist experiment in urban planning that 
embodies the official vision of a model ‘Chinese province.’ Finally, the Postscript is a 
summary reflecting on the recent spatial reform and the possible essentialist pitfalls. 
 
Chapter 2  
 
After the KMT-led government retreated to Taiwan in 1949, the ROC was declared 
‘dead’ by the newly established PRC and was deemed by the international community 
to have ceased to exist. To maintain the ROC’s status as a modern nation-state without 
territorial control over “China proper” was thus highly problematic. Starting in 1951, 
the ROC government on Taiwan has published an annual yearbook – ROC Yearbook 
(Zhonghua Minguo nianjian). This annual publication is a declaration of survival with 
which the ROC asserts its political legitimacy and territorial claims to China. In the 
austerity of the 1950s, the insistence on publishing a national statement in the form of 
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a yearbook was a political decision and a significant spatial strategy declaring its 
rightful ownership of the mainland. It not only demonstrated the KMT’s wish to 
reinforce its status as the only lawful Chinese regime, but was also a strategy to 
legitimize its political rule on the island. This chapter examines the changing definition 
of ‘national territory’ and also analyzes the ROC’s territorial claims and the strategies 
adopted in the ROC Yearbooks of the last 6 decades, from 1951 to 2010.  
 
Within the modern inter-state system, the state is regarded as possessing sovereign 
control over its territorial borders, and the naturalization of ‘state space’ is usually taken 
for granted. In fact these territory-based assumptions evolved in 17th century Europe30 
and usually lead to the “territorial trap” of regarding states as fixed units of sovereign 
space and ‘containers’ of societies (Agnew 1994). In reality, the idea of ‘state space’ 
should not be limited to physical territory, but should also include territorial 
jurisdictions, administrative subdivisions, the physical embodiment of state spaces, 
cultural and symbolic meanings, and spatial strategies. Therefore, after losing control 
of the mainland and fleeing to Taiwan, the flimsy territorial claims made in the post-
war yearbooks relied heavily on the insistence on the regime’s legitimacy and its 
historical legacy.  
 
This chapter considers the ROC’s various territorial claims in the post-war yearbooks 
and evaluates the state’s spatial strategies as set out in these formal national statements. 
It looks at how the concept of the nation – ‘ROC’ – has been presented, not only by 
examining ambiguities and changes in the text of the yearbooks, but also by comparing 
and contrasting the different versions of the ROC Map that were presented over the 
years. Thus, the examination of yearbooks investigates state territoriality beyond the 
 THIS IS THE LAST VERSION OF THE BOOK CHAPTER SUBMITTED TO ROUTLEDGE 
AFTER PEER REVIEW 
 
dimension of physical territory, thereby avoiding the ‘territorial trap.’ 
 
Chapter 3 
 
In the post-war era, geography has served national interests by playing the role of agent 
of the state and acting as the vehicle of modernization. The most politicized 
geographical knowledge and spatial practice is undoubtedly cartography, the post-war 
development of which is the focus of Chapter 3. Because of technological and financial 
requirements, map making has always been controlled by the rich and the powerful. In 
particular, map-making on a large scale is a kind of spatial practice that can only be 
taken up by the state or global enterprises. Far from being the innocent products of 
‘disinterested science’ or decorative collections in museums and libraries, maps are now 
widely recognized as “inscriptions of political power” (Harley 1990b). The ability to 
produce ‘scientific’ and accurate maps and mastery of new cartographic technologies 
symbolize the extent of state power and the degree of modernization. Therefore, the 
exploration of post-war cartographic development in Taiwan reveals how state power 
has been, and continues to be, exercised through the projection of maps and the 
worldview they embody. Because of cross-Strait tension, particular focus of this chapter 
is on examining the stringent control of cartographic knowledge and the rigid scrutiny 
of the production of national maps, and therefore, an officially approved visualization 
of ROC territory, which had been defined and insisted upon by the KMT regime. 
 
Before the completion of the first island-wide land survey in 1980, most of the maps 
that were published in Taiwan and were available on the market were rough duplicates 
of pre-war maps. It is generally recognized that the poor quality of post-war maps in 
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Taiwan was due to strict map censorship and a stifling political atmosphere. In recent 
decades, researchers in Taiwan Studies have started to associate the cartographic 
expression of Taiwan with its historical and political development. So far, most of the 
research has focused on maps produced before 1945 by the Japanese, the Qing and the 
Dutch. In contrast, this chapter concentrates on examining the development of 
cartography in the post-war era. While it is true that Taiwan’s map production was 
extremely poor and under great strain when the ROC was on high security alert, 
Taiwan’s cartographic ability was not as ‘backward’ as it is commonly thought to have 
been. This chapter examines the general problem of the lack of accuracy and apparent 
regression in Taiwan’s cartographic production before the 1980s, explores the reasons 
for this, presents examples of the serious consequences befalling those accused of 
leaking cartographic secrets, and finally, evaluates the popular discourse on Taiwan’s 
post-war cartographic blankness. It does not address map-making technology or 
aesthetic appreciation, but focuses rather on the social and political implications of post-
war cartographic development, exploring the reasons for decades of cartographic 
stagnation and also analyzing how and why changes in cartographic expression and 
discourse came about after the 1980s.  
 
Chapter 4  
 
Chapters 2 and 3 address the issue of state spatiality in terms of institutional forms, 
concentrating on the construction and changing meaning of national territory, borders, 
and the state’s administrative divisions. Chapter 4, on the other hand, takes one 
particular example of urban planning – Chunghsing New Village (Zhongxing xincun) – 
to examine the intricate connections between state spatiality and power relations. 
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Located in Nantou County, Chunghsing New Village was Taiwan’s first post-war ‘new 
town’ and was built to house the Taiwan Provincial Government. The construction of 
Chunghsing New Village began in 1956 in the name of national security, but its design 
aimed to realize a vision of a model province and a modern way of living that was in 
tune with the ROC national imagination. 
 
The first phase of construction was completed in 1957, facilitating the relocation of the 
provincial government from Taipei City to Nantou County and thereby separating local 
government from central government. The provincial government dutifully accepted its 
new secondary status,havinglost its position as Taiwan’s economic, political, and social 
center. In constructing Chunghsing New Village and by relocating the provincial 
government there, the KMT government not only established a clear-cut political 
hierarchy, but also constructed a model community permitting a modern lifestyle, and 
presented a modernist vision of a future China, run according to Sanminzhuyi (Three 
Principles of the People, a political philosophy developed by Sun Yat-sen). In this sense 
Chunghsing New Village mirrored the ROC national imagination and its aspirations. 
But at the same time, the construction of Chunghsing New Village physically inscribed 
the hierarchical division between central state and local government by locating them 
at different sites, and consequently installed a spatial order on Taiwan’s political 
landscape. This stratified power relationship and hierarchy were challenged in the early 
1990s when the increasingly powerful provincial government threatened to overshadow 
the KMT central government. At the end of 1998, the administrative power of the 
province was reduced, ostensibly to streamline government structure. In the decade 
after restructuring, Chunghsing New Village became an empty shell – the location of 
the once autonomous local state and blueprint of a ‘Free China’ was now no more than 
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a relic of the past.  
 
This chapter examines the origin and genealogy of Chunghsing New Village, its 
political and spatial significance, and its changing meaning over the decades. In so 
doing, it explores the interplay between place and power at different historical-political 
junctures and investigates the ways in which the changing relationships have impacted 
on the importance of Chunghsing New Village, the identity of its residents, and also 
symbolically, how the place has been viewed. Thus, an examination of the development 
of this project helps us to understand spatial politics at work. This study of the place, 
therefore, is not simply an investigation into one particular example of urban planning. 
Rather, it becomes a means by which to examine Taiwan’s post-war power struggles 
and social change from the perspective of state spatiality, and the ways in which the 
distribution and redistribution of power that defines the political landscape is articulated 
in spatial terms.  
 
Chapter 5  
 
Although the majority of people have a limited personal experience of the state, the 
abstract concept of ‘nation’ cannot only be taught, it can also be elevated into an object 
of passionate fervor and harnessed to induce patriotic action. This nationalist fervor is 
usually fostered through education, daily school routines, and exposure to national 
symbolism with particular emphasis on national identity. Alongside the democratic 
development and the rise of Taiwanese consciousness over the last two decades, the 
dominant China-centric discourse has given way to a Taiwan-first mindset. There has 
been an increased sense of local pride, the development of a distinctive indigenous 
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culture, and a growing awareness of Taiwanese subjectivity, each contributing to a 
Taiwan-centric sentiment. Chapter 5 examines post-war elementary school textbooks 
used to teach geography-related subjects and analyzes how the imagination of national 
(ROC) geography has been constructed, adjusted, and reshaped in education.  
 
The impact of mass education is extremely significant because it not only produces 
knowledge and reproduces values, but also ‘creates’ people who see no viable 
alternative to the pre-existing condition (Apple 1979: 6). In the case of post-war Taiwan, 
the state not only imposed compulsory mass education, but also tightened its ideological 
grip during the formative years of childhood by extending the duration of compulsory 
education (from six to nine years in 1968) and standardizing textbooks. The ideological 
impact of education was particularly effective during the early post-war decades when 
resources were scarce and access to alternative information was almost impossible. 
Thus, through the analysis of 92 volumes of elementary level geography-related 
textbooks published by the National Institute for Compilation and Translation (NICT, 
Guoli bianyiguan)31 between 1945 and 2000, Chapter 5 investigates what kind of 
geographical ‘knowledge’ and political ideology were systematically taught in school, 
considers the ways in which the state’s involvement in education results in the 
conscious design and construction of a student’s ‘sense of place’ and place identity, and 
in particular explores the state’s intervention in shaping students’ ideas of ‘homeland’ 
and ‘country.’  
 
Postscript 
 
The concluding chapter offers a brief reflection on Taiwan’s post-war spatiality and the 
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prospect of its geographical repositioning. This summary focuses mainly on one place-
specific phenomenon that has been prominent in the last decade – that is, the tendency 
to openly declare one’s love for Taiwan as an identity marker. For example, Chen Shui-
bian, the DPP President between 2000 and 2008, referred to himself as a ‘son of Taiwan’ 
(Taiwan zhi zi). Chen’s public declaration of a ‘rooted’ identity became a symbol of 
loyalty and patriotism. His actions suggest that simply being affectionate and loyal to 
one’s native land is not sufficient; rather, true loyalty must be expressed through deeds 
and declared openly. Thus one’s affection for the land had to be physically 
demonstrated to be believed, either by kissing the ground, visiting every town and 
village, 32  speaking the native languages when addressing the public, or simply 
acknowledging the policy as “ai Tai” (i.e. ‘loving Taiwan’).33 This exploitation of 
people’s genuine affection for their native land harbors the danger, perhaps, of 
mobilizing nationalist fervor like “a religious cult,” leading to an extremist campaign 
of exclusion (Tuan 1977: 177). A sense of rootedness can indeed help people to develop 
an intimate and genuine relationship with the land they inhabit and in which they feel 
‘at home.’ Paradoxically, however, this sense of belonging (and hence, ownership) can 
also generate a tendency towards narrow-mindedness and exclusivity, potentially incite 
hatred against the other, and ultimately make some groups in society ‘homeless.’ 
 
Through the examination of state spatiality in post-war Taiwan, this book aims to 
present an alternative approach to understanding the thorny issue of Taiwanese identity. 
Although every chapter has its distinctive theme, each echoes and complements each 
other and acts as part of a spatial triad, mirroring and supplementing the rest. Although 
my research is region-specific, focusing on Taiwan, the spatial concerns addressed in 
this book are universal. State spatiality and territorial strategies, the close ties between 
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place and identity, the interconnections between geographical knowledge, sense of 
place, and national imagination, and also the relationships between spatial constructions, 
social relations, and spatial symbolism are all issues that have significance beyond the 
immediate context of Taiwan. 
 
Too Big to Ignore  
 
Despite international de-recognition and decades of military intimidation by the PRC, 
Taiwan has thrived. During the most uncertain years of Taiwan’s post-war diplomatic 
history, economically the island seemed to go from strength to strength. In the 1960s, 
Taiwan changed from an agricultural to an industrial society, and its economy 
flourished after the 1970s (DGBAS 1997; Shen 1974: 5; Edmonds 2001: 18). Taiwan 
has made a mark as the world’s electronic factory and has had dealings and trading 
relationships with the world far beyond its limited diplomatic allies. In other words, this 
tiny island is a global economic powerhouse, being not only an electronics giant – 
accounting for 65 per cent of the world’s electronics manufacturing services in 2011 
(Thomas White Global Investment 2011) – but also one of the world’s top investment 
destinations.34  
 
Coinciding with a period of outstanding economic performance, Taiwan’s political 
transformation from authoritarian rule to a fully-fledged, multi-party democracy has 
also been impressive (Winckler 1984). Taiwan’s success story as a stable and maturing 
new democracy is highly regarded and holds up “an example to the PRC and others in 
the region… [to] encourage progress in the furthering of democratic principles and 
practices, respect for human rights, and the enhancement of the rule of law” (US 
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Congress 2000: 11357). Many see Taiwan’s development as the proof of and the model 
for a more democratic, open, and modernized version of China. Moreover, Taiwan 
occupies a position of strategic importance. The island stands at “the geographic 
forefront of the strategic competition” between two political and economic powers – 
the US and the PRC – and thus its every political move is said to have the potential to 
“define the 21st century” (Mazza 2011). 
 
Although Taiwan is more significant, in political and economic terms, than its size 
suggests, nevertheless, for many outsiders, the island is just… an island. Some may 
consider Taiwan to be politically unimportant in comparison to China’s mighty 
presence and regard cross-Strait tension merely as a nuisance and a hangover of the 
Cold War. At most, some would regard Taiwan as an active economic entity, taking it 
as a reference point to understand China, or as a mediator through which to do business 
with the Chinese. The physical size of Taiwan might support the view that it is of no 
great significance in the global context (or indeed even the Chinese context). And 
particularly in recent years, overshadowed by the rising economic power and political 
influence of China, Taiwan may have appeared to be of little consequence to many 
international organizations and politicians, and was deemed dispensable in dealings 
with the PRC. Thus, its existence is often overlooked, its international rights 
disregarded, and the opinions of its 23 million residents ignored.  
 
Over the years, many academics, analysts, and military strategists have urged the 
international community to recognize that “Taiwan matters,”35 and have also proposed 
that Taiwan is “too big to ignore” in international politics and the global economy (New 
York Times 1990). However, the truth of the matter is that size does matter sometimes, 
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and dismissiveness is almost inevitable. Thus, the island has always struggled for 
recognition and can never overcome the international tendency to judge it by its 
smallness. Yet, these taken-for-granted views fail to recognize Taiwan’s strategic 
position and neglect the fact that its influence cannot be evaluated solely by its size. 
Geographically, the island is the artery of East Asia and holds the key to peace in the 
region. Some American analysts have acknowledged its strategic position “astride the 
sea lanes of supply and communication,” which is not just “critical to Japan” but more 
importantly, will guarantee the “freedom of navigation” for the American Navy and 
safeguard U.S. domination in the region (US Congress 2011). Little wonder then that 
analysts see Taiwan as the crucial factor that can easily destabilize East Asian politics 
and trigger regional tension. Some commentators have even described Taiwan as “the 
tail that wags dogs” (McDevitt 2005; Su Chi 2009), because of its ability to upset the 
three great powers in Northeast Asia (China, Japan and the US) and set them in a 
reactive mode. In addition to its strategic, economic and political significance, a 
complex colonial past and cultural mix, its unique post-war development, and the 
success of a ‘Chinese’ model of democratization all mean that Taiwan is too important 
to ignore. As a de facto state, the island plays an indispensable role in the complex web 
of East Asian politics and the global economy. In the post-modern world of high 
mobility, globalization, and interdependent world politics, no place is just an island.  
 
1 Zhongguo guomindang means ‘Chinese Nationalist Party.’ Its predecessor, Tongmenghui, 
was a secret society founded by Sun Yat-sen during the late Qing period. It was reorganized 
as a legal political party after the Qing dynasty was overthrown in 1911. After decades of 
struggles between warlords, the KMT nominally unified China in 1928 and was the ruling 
party until 1949 when it was defeated by the CCP in the civil war.  
2 The DPP was established in 1986 when it was still illegal under martial law to set up a new 
political party. After martial law was lifted in 1987, the DPP became a powerful opposition 
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party, counterbalancing the dominant KMT. In 2000, the DPP won the presidential Election 
and ended half a century of KMT one-party rule. Historically, the party has had a strong 
record on human rights, social justice, and (de jure) Taiwan independence.  
3 The name ‘Formosa’ first appeared in 1590 when the Portuguese passed the island and hailed 
it “Ilha Formosa” (meaning ‘beautiful island’) for its lushness (Cutshall 1944: 247). The 
name was then adopted and in common use in the West up to the mid-20th century. For 
example, ‘Formosa’ rather than ‘Taiwan’ was used in the Cairo Declaration (1943), Potsdam 
Declaration (1945), the Treaty of Peace with Japan (1951), and the Formosa Resolution 
adopted by the US Congress in 1955.  
4 In the early 17th century, the Spanish took control of the northern coast of Taiwan for a short 
period of time (1626-42). This ended when the Dutch moved northward from their southern 
commercial base and drove out their Spanish rivals. The Dutch occupation, too, was short-
lived (1624-62).  
5 In 1662, Ming loyalist general Cheng Cheng-kung (aka. Koxinga) seized control of Taiwan 
from the Dutch, using it as a military base during his campaign to restore the Chinese Ming 
dynasty and resist the new Manchu Qing regime. In 1683, the Ming loyalists surrendered to 
the Qing, and the island was formally annexed by the Qing empire and entered on the maps 
of ‘Chinese territory’ in 1684 (Teng 2004: 44). 
6 Following China’s defeat in the first Sino-Japanese War, the island was ceded to Japan in 
1895 and became its first colony; the islanders were made to “become Japanese.” During 
World War II, because of its strategic position, Taiwan served as the base for Japan’s 
southward advance. 
7 The population in Taiwan was around 6.5 million before the Chinese retrocession in 1945. 
8 Unless otherwise specified, the usage of ‘Taiwan’ in this book usually refers to the ‘Taiwan 
region.’ 
9 Kinmen is also known as Quemoy, or Jinmen. 
10 According to Brah (1996), the ‘homing desire’ of the ‘diaspora’ is different from the ‘desire 
for homeland’ of political exiles. This difference will be discussed in the Postscript. 
11 Ethnologically, Taiwan’s Malayo-Polynesian people are regarded as the original inhabitants 
of the island. However, some would prefer to replace the term ‘yuanzhumin’ (indigenous 
residents) with ‘xianzhumin’ (first residents) or ‘zaozhumin’ (early residents) to emphasize 
that “everyone was an immigrant” (Staintan 1999: 39). They originally inhabited the whole 
of the island and only started to move out of the western plains during the Dutch occupation. 
Their original living space was further encroached upon by Cheng’s military colonization 
during the 17th century. During Qing rule, with the expansion of Chinese settlements, many 
aborigines were forced to retreat deeper into the mountains, while some Pingpuzu (lowland 
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aborigines, or plain aborigines) were sinicized, and lived side by side with the Han Chinese. 
Half a century of Japanese occupation greatly altered the aboriginal lifestyle and habitat 
because of tightening colonial control and forced relocation. After 1945, Taiwan’s aborigines 
became ‘Chinese citizens’ and supposedly had the same legal rights as the Han Chinese. 
However, the most part of post-war aboriginal development has been characterized by Han 
exploitation and a series of China-centric and patronizing policies. Since the 1990s, 
aborigines have campaigned for their rights. To demonstrate official support, the Taiwanese 
government set up the Council of Indigenous Peoples (CIP, yuanzhuminzu weiyuanhui) in 
1996 and has so far officially recognized 14 tribes. Even though the aboriginal policy has 
greatly improved, the indigenous people remain on the lowest rungs of the legal and 
socioeconomic hierarchy and are still trapped in a dominantly Han society. Although the 
issues of aboriginal rights and their struggle for land and traditional usage of the land are 
beyond the scope of this book, I acknowledge the grave damage they have suffered as a result 
of unfair resource distribution, restrictions on their traditional way of living, lack of land 
rights, and the general stereotyping imposed upon them by the Han Chinese as a whole. All 
of which has affected the aborigines socially, economically, politically, and culturally. Even 
with the recent improvement in legal rights and some reversal of discrimination, there is still 
a long way to go to establish an “Indian country,” as it were, in which the aborigines receive 
basic land rights similar to those given to the American Indians.  
12 Fujian Province is also known by its old name Min. The term ‘Minnan’ literally means “the 
south of Min.” 
13 The Hakka is a branch of the Han Chinese. It is said that the Hakka originally came from 
North China and migrated to southern China (especially Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangxi, and 
Guangxi provinces) during the fall of the Southern Song dynasty in the mid-13th century. The 
Hakka population is estimated to number 80 million worldwide. The name Hakka may derive 
from the Cantonese pronunciation of the Mandarin word kejia (Encyclopædia Britannica 
2011). 
14 The incident started off as a relatively small dispute on February 27, 1947. A female vendor 
was apprehended by Monopoly Bureau agents for selling a few untaxed cigarettes. When she 
begged for mercy and appealed to them not to confiscate her goods, she was brutally struck 
down. The crowds started to gather and confronted the agents. They panicked, fired at the 
crowds, and escaped to a nearby police station. In the struggle, an onlooker died of gunshot 
wounds and the public was outraged. The next day, a crowd of some 2000 people went to 
the authorities, demanding punishment for the agents and petitioning for a reform of the 
monopoly policy. Security forces at the Governor-General’s Office fired at the protestors. 
Instead of communicating with the representatives and responding to their demands, 
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Governor Chen I deployed both armed police and army to suppress the uprising (Kerr 1966). 
The uprising spread throughout the island and lasted more than a month. Although the exact 
death toll is still unclear, it is estimated to be between 10,000 and 30,000. The harsh 
crackdown on protests intensified the violence and increased people’s resentment not only 
against the KMT authorities but also against what they stood for – the Chinese regime and 
the mainlanders. Therefore, the incident is seen to be the defining moment that shaped (and 
is still impacting upon) the formation of Taiwanese identity.  
15 In May 2014, the aboriginal population was put at 535,953. This accounts for approximately 
2.29 per cent of Taiwan’s total population of 23,386,883 (MOI 2014a). 
16 There have been different views on the ethnic composition of the Taiwanese population. 
Because of the strict migration policy of the Qing to curb coastal rebellions, most early 
Chinese migrants to Taiwan were male. Intermarriage between the Han Chinese and the 
indigenous tribal women was common. There was thus a folk proverb: “you Tangshan gong 
wu Tangshan ma,” meaning “there were only Chinese grandfathers, but there were no 
Chinese grandmothers.” As a result, some scholars claim that most Taiwanese are ethnically 
mixed people rather than pure Han Chinese (Lin Ma-li 2006). However, this genetic 
discourse is highly controversial. The claim has been seen as part of the nation-building myth 
to support Taiwan independence (Chen Shu-juo and Tuan Hung-kun 2008; Lin Yao-chi 2006). 
There have also been discussions on the linguistic connections, suggesting strong links 
between Taiwanese indigenous tribes and the Austronesian-speaking people in Southeast 
Asia and Oceania (Melton at el. 1998). 
17 The figures were collected and compiled by the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) (2001). 
The figures quoted in this collection of surveys are mostly taken from those conducted by 
the reputable Election Research Centre (ERC) of the National Chengchi University (NCCU). 
However, when there was more than one survey conducted by the ERC (particularly in the 
late 1990s), or none (before 1994), I would give preference to those commissioned by the 
MAC or those which were based on a larger sample of interviewees. 
18  Since the surveys started in 1989, the numbers of those who identified themselves as 
‘Chinese only’ were highest at the beginning – 52% in 1989, 54% in 1990, 32% in 1991, 
44% in 1992, 48.5% in 1993 – and the category ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ grew steadily 
– 26% in 1989, 19% in 1990, 47% in 1991, 36.5% in 1992, 32.7% in 1993. In comparison, 
the number of respondents who identified themselves as ‘Taiwanese only’ remained 
relatively low – 16 % in 1989, 19% in 1990, 12% in 1991, 16.7% in 1992, 16.7% in 1993. 
19  Starting from 1994, the situation was reversed. Fewer and fewer people admitted their 
‘Chinese only’ identity – 24.2 % in 1994, 23.8% in 1995, 20.5% in 1996, 21.8% in 1997, 
18.2% in 1998, 13.7% in 1999, and 13.6% in 2000. At the same time, more and more 
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Taiwanese felt comfortable admitting their ‘Taiwanese only’ identity – 29% in 1994, 27.9% 
in 1995, 24.9% in 1996, 32.8% in 1997, 34.5% in 1998, 39.5% in 1999, and 42.5% in 2000. 
Even so, the share of respondents who identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese 
remained high – 43.2% in 1994, 43.6% in 1995, 49.5% in 1996, 45.4% in 1997, 41.3% in 
1998, 41.5% in 1999, and 38.5% in 2000. The growing trend of ‘Taiwanese-only identity’ 
has continued into the 2000s and is now the dominant category of Taiwanese self-
identification.  
20  Anne Buttimer (1976: 277-92) uses the phrase to mean “the culturally defined 
spatiotemporal setting or horizon of everyday life.” In other words, the term ‘lifeworld’ refers 
to the social context and pattern of daily living that we take for granted. The idea will be 
further discussed in Chapter 5. 
21 According to Cohen (2008: 85-6, 145), the pattern of ‘sojourning’ –circular migration – is 
most common in the Chinese diaspora. 
22 Here, the word xiang is of central importance, signifying ‘native place’ or ‘home village.’ 
Traditionally, the attachment to xiang and one’s ancestral origin was closely associated with 
the filial duties that the Chinese regarded as moral responsibilities. 
23 The courtesy names – zi or hao – were mainly given to men but have not been used since 
the early 20th century. Zi was a name given to mark one’s reaching adulthood (after the age 
of 20) and was used by one’s peers to show respect. It was given either by parents or teachers 
and rarely chosen by the individual. Hao was usually self-selected as the pseudonym. 
Moreover, it was common for intellectuals to have more than one hao. 
24 The name ‘Tai-sheng’ was very common in the 1950s among mainlander boys. Chen Shun-
chang (2009) identified 76 well-known people named ‘Tai-sheng’ in Taiwan. Adopting the 
Chinese naming tradition, the former Director of the American Institute in Taiwan (Taipei 
Office), David Dean also gave his son the Chinese name Tai-sheng during his term of office 
in Taiwan (1979-86).  
25 The phrases such as ‘jiju’ and ‘jiji’ mean ‘temporary resident’ or ‘living away from home.’ 
On the old ROC identity card used on the mainland there were two entries for ‘benji’ (original 
home) and ‘jiji’ (temporary home). 
26 The idea deep space is “quintessentially social space… physical extent fused through with 
social intent” (N. Smith 1984: 214). 
27 In the English translation of Lefebvre’s book The Production of Space, the phrase was 
translated as “representational spaces” (1991:33). However, Soja (1996: 61) believes that a 
better translation would be “spaces of representation,” which Brenner and Elden also use in 
their translation of Lefebvre’s book – State, Space, World: Selected Essays (Lefebvre 2009: 
229). 
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28 There is a large amount of outstanding research focusing on Taiwanese identity. Cases in 
point are Chun (1994); Wachman (1994); Hsiau (2000); Makeham and Hsiau (2005); Corcuff 
(2002); Hughes (1997); Wang Fu-chang (2005); Ngo and Wang (2011). 
29 Taiwan was usually seen by western scholars as an alternative to China when it was difficult 
to go to the mainland to do fieldwork before the late 1970s. Even so, publications in English 
about Taiwan geography were very few during the early post-war era. Scholarly publications 
on geographical topics relating to Taiwan were mostly written in Chinese and Japanese. 
Those written in English were limited in number and were mainly the results of research on 
traditional aspects of geography, i.e. the land, geographical features, inhabitants, and the 
economy of Taiwan. Unless otherwise stated, the discussion here refers to publications 
written in English. 
30 Since the mid-17th century, the European inter-state system has generally been presented as 
the dominant form of geopolitical organization. Within the Westphalian system, the two 
elements ‘sovereignty’ and ‘territoriality’ have been tightly linked (Ruggie 1993). 
31 In 2011, the NICT was merged into the National Academy of Educational Research (NAER). 
32 According to Rigger (2001: 178-79), during the 1994 governor election James (Chu-yu) 
Soong relied heavily on the support of then president Lee Teng-hui to ‘overcome the liability’ 
of his mainlander ethnic background. To demonstrate that he really cared about the people 
and was in touch with the provincial reality, Soong endeavored to visit every provincial city, 
town, and village at least once during his four-year term of office as governor.  
33 For example, the 2008 electoral agenda drawn up by the KMT Presidential election used the 
slogan ‘ai Tai 12 xiang jianshe’ (Love-Taiwan Twelve Constructions) which later became 
the national policy under the Ma Ying-jeou administration (Executive Yuan 2009). 
34 In September 2011, Taiwan was rated the third best destination for investment (i.e. up one 
place from fourth best in the previous report), just behind Singapore and Switzerland. This 
survey was conducted by the Business Environment Risk Intelligence (BERI). The BERI 
report studied the investment climate and competitiveness of 50 major world economies by 
evaluating each country’s operational risk, political risk, and foreign exchange risk. Among 
major Asian economies, Taiwan was ahead of Japan (no. 11), China (no. 13), Malaysia (no. 
16), South Korea (no. 17), and Australia (no. 19) (Norway News 2011). 
35 Over the years, there have been many similar calls, for example, Wachman (2007), Rigger 
(2011), Copper (2011), Committee on Foreign Affairs (2011).  
